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their explicit description (i.e., a model 
of the world), or on the implicit, natural 
relationships that exist within the unitary 
system composed of both the organism 
and the environment. In the former case, 
prediction of future events occurs via the 
explicit manipulation of the description of 
the world against some metric of time. In 
contrast to this “weak” form of anticipa-
tion, which requires an expensive degree 
of energy to be sustained over time, a sys-
temic form of anticipation may arise from 
the natural dispositions of both compo-
nents of the system: a so-called “strong” 
anticipation based on the delayed feedback 
between the physical elements of the sys-
tem, the properties of their synchronization 
and the strength of the coupling between 
them (Stepp and Turvey, 2010). The exam-
ple of the oil drop in the saline solution that 
successfully exits a maze by following an 
appropriate Ph gradient illustrates this lat-
ter situation (Lagzi et al., 2010; http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=RXgP8rq_wfA). 
Arguably the oil drop does not possess or 
manipulate a model of the world to achieve 
this feat, but the interaction over time of the 
Ph of the oil drop with that of the saline 
solution leads the oil drop to move in the 
appropriate direction.
In this context, enactive processes con-
trast sharply with the models described 
by Clark in that they assume an implicit, 
cheaper (energy-wise), representation-lean 
reference to the future, as the natural, bidi-
rectional relation between the organism 
and the environment unfolds over time. We 
thus submit that these models may be more 
immune to most informational bottlenecks 
evident in light of the requirements for sur-
viving in the world, as exemplified by the 
historical debates we referred to earlier, 
and may therefore be more adequate than 
other models to account for  cognition. At 
Undeniably, anticipation plays a crucial 
role in cognition. By what means, to what 
extent, and what it achieves remain open 
questions. In a recent BBS target article, 
Clark (in press) depicts an integrative 
model of the brain that builds on hier-
archical Bayesian models of neural pro-
cessing (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 
2005; Brown et al., 2011), and their most 
recent formulation using the free-energy 
principle borrowed from thermodynam-
ics (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston, 
2010; Friston et al., 2010). Hierarchical 
generative models of cognition, such as 
those described by Clark, presuppose the 
manipulation of representations and inter-
nal models of the world, in as much detail 
as is perceptually available. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, Clark acknowledges the existence 
of a “virtual version of the sensory data” 
(p. 4), but with no reference to some of 
the historical debates that shaped cognitive 
science, related to the storage, manipula-
tion, and retrieval of representations in 
a cognitive system (Shanahan, 1997), or 
accounting for the emergence of intention-
ality within such a system (Searle, 1980; 
Preston and Bishop, 2002). Instead of dem-
onstrating how this Bayesian framework 
responds to these foundational questions, 
Clark describes the structure and the func-
tional properties of an action-oriented, 
multi-level system that is meant to com-
bine perception, learning, and experience 
(Niedenthal, 2007).
As pointed out by Clark, extreme models 
within this framework reduce experience 
to a mere by-product of the relationship 
between neural anticipatory signal and 
motor commands. Rightfully, Clark is 
uncertain of the radical proposal that we 
might “do away with the need to appeal to 
goals and rewards” (p. 59), and attempts 
to reinstate some aspects of emotional 
experience in the form of a frame of ref-
erence against which is construed this 
action-oriented predictive framework. We 
submit that this argument falls short of 
momentum in accounting for a rich phe-
nomenology. Emotional experience simply 
cannot be reduced to a frame of reference: 
embodiment and embeddedness are at the 
core of the organism’s identity in its lived 
world, and fundamental aspects of emo-
tional experience (Niedenthal, 2007). These 
features of experience situate the organism 
in the environment, which perceives and 
interacts with its immediate surrounding. 
This situatedness can only arise from con-
centric cycles of operations that combine 
integrated levels of anticipation with enac-
tive processes of interaction with the envi-
ronment. Anticipation not only takes place 
in the brain, which is the preferred level 
of perspective in the models introduced by 
Clark, but also at the many levels contained 
within the body, and between the body and 
the environment (Kurthen, 2007). In such 
a framework, the brain is a necessary but 
not sufficient part of the enactive organ-
ism, and emotion takes a central place as 
the scaffolding to awareness, especially in 
action-oriented perspectives (Frijda et al., 
1989).
By enactive processes, we refer to the 
closed-loop operations that settle the 
organism in the environment, which are 
grounded in, and shaped by the interaction 
itself, and that lead to the organism acting 
in ways optimal for adaptation and sur-
vival, supporting perception, learning, and 
experience. Within this framework, antici-
pation evidently plays a critical role in miti-
gating the interface with the environment. 
This situation relies on both the existence 
of natural constraints in the environment, 
and on the organism’s sensitivity to these 
constraints, which can either be based on 
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the level of the (embodied) brain, enac-
tive processes may interface with the envi-
ronment through several mechanisms 
including the synchronization of neural 
assemblies and large-scale integration of 
information (Engel et al., 2001; Varela et al., 
2001). Much is needed to characterize these 
mechanisms.
In conclusion, we would like to for-
mulate a word of caution. It is a mistake 
to conclude that, because model x can 
account for data y (epistemic concerns), 
therefore it must provide an accurate 
description of the inner workings of the 
brain (ontological description). Unless 
the model describes all the complexities 
of the embodied brain, embedded in the 
environment, one is almost always going 
to be making a conflation mistake. An 
extreme example might be represent-
ing “emotion” using a real number and, 
because this model can account for some 
data, wrongfully conclude that there must 
be an equivalent to the real number in the 
brain. Arguably, Clark’s review of a wide-
range of data to justify hierarchical genera-
tive models falls into this category.
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